What next for the peace negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC? by Haspeslagh, Sophie
LSE Global South Unit
Policy Brief Series
What next for the peace negotiation 
between the Colombian government and the FARC?
Policy Brief No.1/2015.
By Sophie Haspeslagh.
ISSN 2396-765X
LSE Global South Unit · Policy Brief Series
INTRODUCTION.
e peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) ocially 
started in October 2012. e negotiations are being held in Havana, Cuba and followed a 
pre-negotiation phase, which included a year and a half of discreet contacts and condence 
building measures as well as six months of secret exploratory talks. e negotiations have 
already led to three substantive agreements on land reform, political participation and the 
illegal drugs trade. ree agenda points remain on the rights of the victims of the conict, the 
end of the conict (cease-re and disarmament) and the implementation of all the agreed points.
e ongoing peace negotiation in Colombia is already informing other processes around the 
globe. e agenda is clear, the rules of the game explicit and the political will apparent. It is 
evident that the current negotiations have been well prepared during a two-year process of 
pre-negotiation. ere have also been a number of innovative mechanisms put in place such 
as the historical Commission, the victims’ delegations and the gender sub-commission. But, 
as with any peace negotiations, substantial challenges lie ahead. Based on interviews in 
Bogotá and Havana and experience working on other peace processes here are a few 
reections on ve key challenges that lie ahead:
FROM GUARANTORS TO FACILITATORS
A key strength of the process has been the fact that it is completely led by the country itself. 
is should guarantee that Colombia will “own” any peace agreement. e guarantors (Cuba 
and Norway) have played a positive role, particularly during moments of crisis in the talks. 
As guarantors they ensure that the parties comply with what has been agreed, but also act as 
observers to the negotiations. However, it is clear that today we are in a dierent and crucial 
phase of the process. It will be much harder to achieve partial accords because the topics that 
remain are deeply intertwined. e issue of what punishment should be given for the worst 
human rights violators is intrinsically linked to negotiating the end of the conict and the 
disarmament of the FARC, for example. ey are also topics on which nding consensus 
between the parties is becoming increasingly challenging. In this context one could think of 
changing the methodology. ird parties that facilitate rather than just guarantee could take 
on a more dynamic role.  A facilitator does not provide the negotiating parties with a solution 
but helps them to nd one using the right techniques. Facilitators can develop proposals 
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between the parties on sequencing and formulation, bringing oxygen with new ideas. It is 
also a good way for proposals to avoid being seen as originating from either party.
INVEST IN SHIFTING PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion in Colombia is still deeply divided when it comes to these peace negotiations 
with the FARC. In this context, the role played by the mainstream media, which continues 
to use the word ‘terrorist’, is not helpful. ere is a high risk of spoilers prevailing, and ways 
need to be found to co-opt them. Colombia has a long experience in undertaking 
communication campaigns at the global level; for example, the campaign headlined by the 
slogan ‘Colombia, the risk is that you will want to stay’ has had much success. It is crucial that 
substantial resources are invested in a communications strategy to support peace in 
Colombia. It is important to involve the business sector and other actors who could 
demystify prejudices against the process. e Colombian Oce of the High Commissioner 
for Peace is already leading valuable work on peace pedagogy, but there is a need for more 
proactivity and outreach to arenas of public opinion that are set against the process, which 
could have a ‘multiplier eect’. One group that should be particularly targeted are young 
people who have not had the experience of previous peace processes with the guerrillas. It is 
also important to continue the eorts to humanise the FARC.
BILATERAL CEASE-FIRE AS A WAY OF BUILDING TRUST
e recent agreement on de-escalating the conict is a welcome step in the right direction. 
e process has achieved a level of maturity that should allow for a clear plan to get to a 
bilateral cease-re. e Colombian population needs to feel some tangible and signicant 
peace dividends from the negotiations. A bilateral cease-re could be established through 
steps previously agreed between the parties to consolidate what has already been achieved 
with the unilateral cease-res on the part of the FARC and the pause in the bombardments 
of the FARC by the government in order to establish the basis for denitive accords.
REDUCE THE FARC’S ISOLATION
It is understandable that the negotiations are taking place outside Colombia so as to 
guarantee condentiality and security and to ensure that the dynamics are considerably 
dierent from the Caguán negotiations. Nevertheless, one of the negative side eects of the 
location is that the FARC continue to be largely isolated from Colombian reality, which may 
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prevent them making the necessary concessions or taking the steps expected by many 
Colombians, particularly in the areas of justice and forgiveness. e victim delegations that 
have travelled to Havana have had a deep impact on all negotiating parties, including the 
FARC. But the FARC do not have other pathways of reconciliation with Colombian society 
or much access to dierent and challenging perspectives at the moment. ere are few people 
travelling to Havana; Colombian nationals still require permits from the Colombian Oce 
of the High Commissioner for Peace. It is important to think of models for generating spaces 
to allow the FARC to reconnect with contemporary Colombian society.
RESOLVE THE FARC’S SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE POST-CONFLICT SETTING
e existing Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) model in Colombia is 
based on recent demobilisations that have been individually focussed, almost exclusively 
urban in scope, and where the political dimension of reintegration has been set aside. In the 
case of the FARC, this model needs to be adapted to the whole group’s characteristics and 
past experience. It looks like the FARC is considering a collective demobilisation model more 
focused on rural areas. Maintaining the organisation’s structures in a post-conict 
environment, however, can have both positive and negative eects. From the point of view of 
the government, there is the worry that demobilised groups will retain their power and carry 
on involvement in violent or criminal activities. ere are examples in Colombia itself when 
this was the case; for example, with the paramilitary demobilisation in Medellín. However, if 
you look at it from the perspective of the future demobilised actors themselves, a collective 
demobilisation can diminish risk and uncertainty, which is prevalent during intense 
transitions. By maintaining the structure of the organisation itself, the consequent reduction 
in uncertainty can help reduce the attractiveness for the rank and le of reverting to arms or 
getting involved in criminal activities.
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